PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY

DECISIONS SELECTED

FROM

THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS.
Following Barthi v. Backus, 14o N. Y. 230, and Townsend
v. COpe, 151 Ill. 62, it was held in Security Trust Co. v. Dodd,
19 Sup. Ct. 545, that an assignment for creditors,
Extra.
territorial executed under a Minnesota statute which pracEff"
tically created an insolvent law by providing that
only releasing creditors should share in the assigned estate,
passed no title to property outside of the state as against an
attaching creditor (even with notice) in another state.

ASSOCIATIONS.
It has sometimes been argued that a by-law, under which a
member of an association may be expelled without any opporExpulsion of tunity for defence on his part, is illegal, and that
Member,
any proceedings taken under such a law are of no
Opportunity legal effect.
In Berkhout v. Supreme Royal
for Dfenc Arcanum, 43 Atl. I, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey places a qualification on this rule, which is stated in the
following words : "A by-law which provides for the expulsion
of a member without affording him an opportunity of defending himself against the charges upon which his expulsion is
based is not altogether null and void, but only so to the extent
that it deprives such member of a hearing from which he might
possibly derive a benefit; and where it conclusively appears
that no such result has followed its enforcement, the existence
of such a provision in it will not be held to invalidate the proceedings taken under it.
Applying this qualification to the facts of the case, the court
sustained an expulsion under a by-law providing for a summary expulsion upon proof of the commission of a felony by
a member; it appearing that, at the time of 1 expulsion, the
complaining member was in prison for the crue, and a notice
to attend the meeting of the inquiry committee could not pos.sibly have been acted upon by him; moreover, since he had
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ASSOCIATIONS (Continued).

confessed the commission of the crime in open court, the result
of an inquiry by the committee in his presence would have
necessarily been the same.
The first of these two reasons does not seem to be'very
strong, since even if the member could not have appeared personally, he might have been represented by his attorney.
BANKRUPTCY.

In re Camp, 91 Fed. 745, determines some new points under
the new bankruptcy law: (I) That it is the duty of the trustee,
under § 47, to set apart his exemption to the
New Act
bankrupt without reference to any action by state
officials; (2) That, following the Georgia decision, but appar-.
ently, also, with the court's own approval, a bankript partner.
is entitled to exemption out of the firm assets, provided, however, that upon an adjustment of the firm accounts it appears
that he has any equity therein. The numerous conflicting
decisions on the latter point are well collated.
BANKS AND BANKING.

Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, went a long way in the protection afforded to instrumentalities of the United States GovNational
ernment, when it held that national banks are not
Banks, Usury

affected by the penalties of state usury laws.

Gadsden v. Thrush, 78 N. W. (Neb.) 632, limits this privilege
by deciding that the exemption from liability does not apply
to a mortgage given to a third person to secure a usurious
loan made by the bank.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Lindley v. Hoffman, 53 N. E. (Ind.) 471, reminds us of an
exception to the general rule that a blind man, who signs an
instrument on the faith of hearing it read by anFraud in
Reading Note other, is not liable to a bona fide holder for value
to Blind Man, if he has been deceived by a fraudulent and incorEstoppel
rect reading of the note. In this case the answer
of defendant merely alleged that defendant was compelled to
rely on the faith of the payee, who read the note to him, but
it did not set forth any facts which showed that defendant
might not have procured a disinterested person to read the
note and acquaint him of its contents. For this reason the
answer was held insufficient to rebut the inference of negli;ence on defendant's part.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has applied the relation of carrier and passenger to the following rather novel
case: Plaintiff, who had taken passage on an
Street
Railway,

electric car, purchased an exchange ticket to ride

Negligence

leaving the car, walked some distance to the

Pasenger,

in another direction on defendant's line, and, on

junction where she was to take the connecting car. The latter
arrived at the junction, and, since that was the end of its
route, the seats and the trolley pole were reversed. Plaintiff
,had just left the pavement to take her seat in the car, when
the pole, which was being pulled around, broke, and inflicted
a severe injury upon her.
The court held as a matter of law that, while plaintiff might
have ceased to be a passenger when she left the first car, yet
that when she had left the pavement and was almost in. the
act of getting on the second one, she was, to all intents and
purposes, within the custody'of the defendant company and
entitled to the rights of a passenger; therefore, in the absence
of other evidence, a primafacie case of negligence against the
defendant had been proved: Keator v. Traction Co., 43 Atl. 87.
The Supreme Court of Vermont has added another to the
many decisions holding that a printed notice on the back of a
Limitation of

Liability
Printed on

railroad ticket limiting the liability of the carrier

does not constitute a contract between the carrier
and the passenger. The question involved in such

cases is that only of assent to the conditions.
"Assent will not be presumed unless the proposed limitations
are known by the passengers, and then much will depend upon
whether they are reasonable or unreasonable. If not entirely
reasonable, assent will not be presumed from knowledge
merely, because the carrier, without such assent, is under the
common law liability, and has the passenger at a disadvantage.
The passenger's circumstances and necessities may be such as
would compel him to assent to almost any conditions or limitations. Hence, when the conditions or limitations are not
entirely reasonable, it is generally held that the assent to them
will not be implied from a knowledge of them, but express
assent must be established." In this case the condition was
the familiar limitation of liability for wearing apparel to the
-value of $ioo, and the evidence did not even establish the
knowledge of plaintiff as to its existence: Ranchan v. Rutland
,R. R. Co., 43 Atl. i i.
Ticket
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

It seems rather unfortunate that laws made for the benefit
of veteran soldiers so often fail of their object, generally
because their enthusiastic framers forget the existRemoval
fro, Office, ence of the constitutions of the state and the Uriited

Restriction by

States.

Legislature

The Pennsylvania Act of May 26, 1897,
.

P. L. xo7, provided that Union soldiers occupying
public positions should not be discharged without reasonable
cause. Article VI, § 4, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
provides that "appointed officers, other than the judges of
courts of record and the superintendent of public instruction,
may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they
shall be appointed." When it was attempted to apply the
above act to the case of a warden of a county prison appointed
by the county commissioners, Judge Pershing intimated (although the point of the constitutionality of the act was not
directly before the court, on account of an obscurely worded
proviso) that the act was, in general, an attempt to nullify the
discretionary power of removal given to the appointing bodies;
and the fact seems plain. Judge Pershing's decision was
affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court, though. this can
scarcely be taken to be a definite ruling on the constitutionality of the act: Brower v. Kantner, 43 Atl. 7.
In Loeb v. Trustees of Columbia Township, 91 Fed. 37, the
United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio
Taxation, has declared unconstitutional a statute assessing
Assessment the cost of a road improvement upon the abutters
byFrontFoot, by front foot. An assessment such as this, made
Due Process without regard to special benefits, takes private
property without due process of law. This decision follows
the recent case of Norwoodv. Baker, 19 Sup. Ct. 187, in which
the Supreme Court of the United States, by a divided court
(Gray, Brewer and Shiras dissenting), condemned assessment
by frontage. Brewer, J., who dissented in the latter case on
the ground that "it is, beyond question, a-legislative function
to determine the area benefited by such improvements, and the
legislative determination is conclusive," is supported by Cooley,
Taxation, 2d Ed., p. 644, et seq., and Dillon, Munic. Corp.,
4geus v. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 416,
4 th Ed., Vol. 2, § 752.
and Philadelphiav. Rule, 93 Pa. I (i88o), support the majority
opinion.
CONTRACTS.

In Cooney v. Lincoln, 42 AUt. 867 (Supreme Court of Rhode
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CONTRACTS (Continued).

Island), which was an action for personal injuries, the plaintiff's
Ment
capacity of

replication to defendant's plea of a general release
from the plaintiff for the grievances complained of,

Party
set forth that the release was obtained from the
plaintiff while she was suffering from the injuries for which
the suit was brought, and while she was under the influence
of opiates, and not in the possession of her full mental powers.
Held, that the replication should have averred either that
plaintiff's lack of mental capacity at the time of making the
release was so great as to render her incapable of understanding the effect of the instrument, or that defendant had notice
of her mental condition when he procured the release.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Section 2194 of Burns' Rev. Statutes of 1894 (Indiana)
provides that whoever shall ." sell, barter, or give away" any
Sae orGift liquor on certain days shall be subject to a penalty.
of Liquor
The Appellate Court of Indiana occupies nine
columns of the Northeastern Reporter in proving that this
statute does not render criminal a gentleman who invites some
friends to his rooms and opens a bottle of champagne for them
as an act of hospitality: Austin v. State, 53 N. E. 48 1.
The subject of gifts and sales of intoxicating liquors is exhaustively treated by Luther E. Hewitt, Esq., in 38 AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER, 17.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES.
The Court of Chancery of New Jersey has recently construed the New Jersey Statute (P. L. 1887; 3 Gen. St. p.
3763, § 34), which prevents the lapsing of legacies
Lapsed
Legacy,
in certain cases. The statute provides, inter alia,
Vested
that when an estate is devised or bequeathed to
Interest
any child of the testator, and that child shall die
within the lifetime of the testator, leaving any child who shall
survive the testator, the estate shall not lapse, but "shall vest
in such child . . . in the same manner as if such legatee or
devisee had survived the testator or testatrix and had died
intestate."
In Suydam v. Voorhees, 43 At. 4, a legacy to a deceased
child was claimed by his child, and the question was whether
or not the legacy was subject to a debt of the claimant's father.
Relying on the words, -shall vest," in the statute the court
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held that the legacy was not so liable, but noted the fact that
the contrary result has been reached in the interpretation of
the corresponding English statute. See Eager v. FUrnivall,
17 Ch. D. 15.
SVIDENCE.

In an action against a natural gas company for an oversupply of gas, whereby a gas stove was overheated and the
Res inter house burned down, it appeared that the supply
Alias Acta
of gas was uniform to all houses throughout the.
city, but that the supply to each house was regulated by an
appliance called a " mixer," of which the consumer possessed
the key, and that it was in his power to shut off or regulate
the supply.
The trial court admitted evidence to the effect that on the
night of the fire stoves of other residents in the city were overheated. This was held to be error by the Appellate Court of
Indiana, in that there was no proof that the witnesses'
"mixers" were admitting the same amount of gas as that of
the owner of the house which had been burned: L N. & I.
Gas Co. v. N. H. Ins. Co., 53 N. E. 485.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

fohnson v. Johnson, 49 S. W. (Tenn.) 305, decided that a
petition by a husband to be credited for excessive income
Right to Sue

paid to his wife under an order of alimony is not

demurrable, on the ground that it is a suit by
husband against a wife.
Some of the Western states allow a deserted wife, instead of
suing for a divorce, if she prefers, to bring an action for mainDesertion, tenance to compel her husband to contribute
Action for

permanently to her support.* In Mc2uhin v.

McMullin, 56 Pac. (Cal.) 554, after such suit
brought, the husband, in good faith, offered to return and
furnish his wife with a home. It was held that this furnished
a defence to the suit, not because of any tenderness for delinquent husbands, but because of the law's aversion to the
separation of spouses.
Maintenance

In re Neff, 56 Pac. (Wash.) 383, decides that the decree of
a divorce court, awarding the custody of the children to the

454

PROGRESS

OF THE LAW.

HUSBAND AND WIFE (Continued).

injured mother, is at best.only temporary; and'
upon the death of the mother, the father, in the
Chilren
absence of evidence of his unfitness, is entitled to
recover their custody as against the testamentary guardian of
the mother.
Divorce,

custody of

In Kistler v. Ernst, 56 Pac. (Kan.) 18, it was properly held
that the rights of a husband in his deceased wife's estate
are not to be taken away except by plain lanAntenupti
Contract
guage. His antenuptial agreement that she might
will it to whom she chose, was held, therefore, not to estop
him from claiming as her heir upon her death intestate.
The courts are but slowly getting away from the common
law conception of the relation of husband and wife. In SamWife's Rght arzevosky v. Baltimore Rwy. Co., 42 Atl. (Md.)
to Sue for
2o6, the common law rule that husband and wife
Persoral
must sue jointly for injury to wife was adhered
njurles
to, although the Maryland Act of 1892 reserved
to a married woman her own property. A mere right of
action, says the court, is not property. This has been remedied by an act passed in 1898.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Meyer v. Illinois Central R. Co., 52 N. E. (Ill.) 849, decides, following RailroadCo. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (a case
Feilow-ser. of an engineer), that a conductor is only a fellowvants
servant of a brakeman, not a vice-principal. "Thefact that one of the number of servants is invested with
power to control and direct the actions of others, will not
in itself render the master liable for the negligence of the
governing servant." The difficulty of deciding the fellowservant problem is seen in Chicago & E. L R. Co. v. Driscoll,
52 N. E. (Ill.) 92 1, where the court held, as matter of law,
that the members of two switching crews are fellow-servants.
Kinwade v. Chicago, H. & St. P. Ry. Co., 78 N. W. (Ia.).
698, was a case where the plaintiff was thrown from a train
Feliow-ser- on which he was employed as the result of a
vants
quarrel between two employes. In spite of a
statute making a railroad company liable in general for the
negligence of a co-employe, it was held that the company was
not liable, because the guilty employe, in striking the blow,
was not acting within the scope of his employment.
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'MORTGAGES.

Clifford v. fZlinor, 78 N. W. (Minn.) 86i, follows the familiar rule that the purchase of premises, subject to mortgage,
Assumption is not liable personally for the mortgage .debt
except upon proof of his promise to pay it.
Weadock v. NVoeker, 78 N. W. (Mich.) 669, holds that a
Paymentof junior mortgagee, who pays taxes to. protect his
Taxes
mortgage, has a lien for the amount of the taxes
superior to that of the senior mortgagee.
In Michigan unrecorded mortgages, whether of real or
personal property, are void as against creditors. In Baker v.
Parkhnrst, 78 N. W. (Mich.) 643, this principle
Failureto
Record
was applied. It appeared that the mortgaged
property had been sold by the mortgagor to a third party
with the con';ent of all parties in interest, and the proceeds
paid to the mortgagee on account of the mortgage. It was
held that, in legal effect, this was the same as if the property
had been sold under the unrecorded mortgage, and the proceeds were, therefore, attachable by the creditors, who had
given credit while the mortgage was kept off the record.
Even in these days railway mortgages do not always and
of necessity cover after-acquired property, as is proved by the
case of Louisvillc Trust Co. v. Cincinnati Inclined
AfterPlane Rwy. Co., 91 Fed. 699. The mortgage,
Acquired
executed in 1879, covered "the railways, rails,
Property
bridges and real estate," "all and singular the cars and rolling stock," the franchises and property of the company, etc.
It was held that these words, not referring to after-acquired
property, included simply the railways, cars and property of
the company then in existence. The additional words, "tolls,
incomes, issues and profits," were he!d, however, to cover
such additional new rolling stock as was necessary for the acquiring of income.
NEGLIGENCE.

In an action against a railroad for insanity, resulting from a
nervous shock received in a collision, it appeared that in two
Proximate instances after the collision plaintiff had been a
witness of other accidents on the same road, and
Cause,
o
n"
qetoal
Insanity
from Sight of it was questionable whether her insanity had not
Accidents
been induced from the horrible sights seen in the
latter cases. The trial judge charged the jury that if plain-
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tiff's insanity was caused by either of the two latter accidents,.
or even by them in conjunction with the accident in which
plaintiff was injured, then their verdict must be for the defendant. Counsel for the defendant excepted to this charge-for
what reason it is rather hard to see. The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts overruled the exceptions without comment:
Rooney v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 53 N. E. 435.
The sensible rule of applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the cases of broken electric wires, is now becoming
general. Thus the Court of Appeals of New
Re Ips
Loquitur, Jersey has properly held that where a broken:
ElectrlcWires telephone wire had fallen across an unguarded
trolley wire and hung down into the street, so that plaintiff,
who picked up the end to remove it from the path of his
horse, was injured, the questions of the negligence of the
telephone company and the trolley company, as well as that
of plaintiff's contributory negligence, were for the jury: N Y
& N.J. Tel. Co. et a. v. Bennett, 42 Ati. 750.

t'ARTNERSHIP.

There is no principle of law better settled than that when
a partner sells or mortgages firm property; he conveys only
Mortgage of his interest in the firm after the debts are paid,
Partner's and the grantee gains no title to any specific
In reaching this result, however, the
Interest in chattels.
Firm Property Supreme Court of Indiana uses language, which
intimates that this court has joined the rapidly-growing number of those who recognize the entity of a partnership apart
from the partners, just as the entity of a corporation apart
from the stockholders.
"While, in fact, a partnership is composed of individual
members, still a firm so constituted is recognized as a distinct
legal entity different and distinct from the persons who compose it. Therefore the principle is universally recognized that
a partner's interest in or title to the firm property is not an
interest in or title to any specific property. The effects or
property of the partnership belong to the firm so long as it
exists, and not to the members who compose it :" Johnson v.
Shirley, 53 N. E. 459.
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RUAL PROPERTY.

In Murray v. Crozer, 53 N. E. 477, A leased land with a
provision in the lease that after A's death the rent should be
Lease. Pro- paid to his wife for life. The Appellate Court 6f
vision for Indiana held the provision void for two reasons:
Disposal of
(i) Since rents, being in the nature of chattels
Rent after
Death of
real and annexed to the realty, are incidents of
Lessor
the reversion and pass to the heir, the owner of
the land cannot alien that portion of them which become due
after his death, and (2) since this was in effect a testamentary
disposition of property and lacked the formalities required by
the statute of wills.
In Sampson v. Grogan, 42 Atl. 713, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island gives a learned opinion on the subject of waste
Tenant for by tenants for life. The defendant in the case
Life, Waste,
Accidental

Burning of

was the executor of a life tenant, who held the
property under a will which provided that she
(the life tenant) was to occupy the house for life,
"she to keep the same in repair." The house

was accidentally burned during her tenancy, and this action
was brought after her death against her executor by the remainderman.
The court, after examining all the authorities, English and
American, since the statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester,
comes to the conclusions (i) that under Gen. Laws, R. I., c.
268, providing that a life tenant who shall commit or suffer
waste shall forfeit the place wasted and double the amount of
the waste, the life tenant in this case was not responsible, and
(2) that the implied promise of the tenant to keep the house
in repair was not broad enough to render her liable for an
accidental fire, although the court admits that it would have
been otherwise had she been in possession under a lease.

SALRS.

The Supreme Court of Vermont adheres to the strict rule
of caveat emptor in Warren v. Buck, 42 Atl. 979, and holds
that a farmer selling hogs to a butcher, knowing
Implied
Warranty that the latter intends to convert them into pork
for resale to his customers, does not impliedly warrant them
to be fit for use as food.
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SURETYSHIP.

It hardly required the authority of a decided case to show
Pev on that the mere acceptance of the resignation of a
-f Principal defaulting official does not release his surety from
liability: Stemmerman v. Lilienthal, 32 S. E. (S. C.) 535.

TRADE-NAME.

Two firms in the same business, the Tygerts and the Aliens,
formed a corporation under the name of the Tygert-Allen
taches, Bar Company, and agreed to allow it to use their
to Equitable trade-names as far as they should apply or become
Relief
necessary in the business. The Tygert-Allen
Company continued in business for some time, during which
it did not use the name "Tygert" on its goods, but advertised them as "Allen's Phosphates," etc. Subsequently a new
corporation, called the Tygert Company, was formed by some
of the members of the Tygert-Allen Company, and used the
name "Tygert" for their trade-name.
In a bill in equity for an injunction to prevent the Tygert
Company from using this-trade-name, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decided that the fact that complainant had been
content to see the defendant use the name "Tygert" for three
years without any objection and without any attempt by complainant to use it, was sufficient to bar complainant from
equitable relief: Tygert-Alen Co. v. Tygert Co., 43 Atl. 224.

TRIAL.

Scarcely a month passes in which an attorney does not demand a postponement of a case or a new trial, etc., on account
In Ill. Cent.
Newspaper of what appears in the newspapers.
Comments, Rwy. Co. v. Souders, 53 N. E. 408, which was an
New Trial
action against a railroad for personal injuries, the
defendant, on a motion for a new trial, offered an affidavit that
there had appeared in the newspapers of Chicago during the
trial notices of the suit, and statements that on a former trial
plaintiff had been awarded a verdict of $15,000, which affiant
believed had found their way to the jury room. But since no
opinion on the merits of the case had been stated in the newspapers, the trial court very properly refused to grant a new
trial on that ground, and its decision was sustained by the
Supreme Court of Illinois.
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TRUSTS.

The vexed question as to whether a declaration of trust
made by a person placing money in a bank creates a valid
Deposit in

trust, if it does not come to the knowledge of the

Declaration

peals of Maryland.

Savings Bank, cestui que trust, has come before the Court of Apof

Money was deposited by A

in a savings bank and the following memorandum
was made on the pass book: " Metropolitan Savings Bank, in
account with A. In trust for herself and B, joint owners,
subject to the order of either; the balance at the death of
either to belong to the survivor."
The court held this to be a valid declaration of trust, and
B was entitled to claim the whole fund on A's death, notwithstanding the fact that she was unaware of the creation of the
trust and that A had retained the book during her' life: ANitwlland v. Whalen, 43 AtI. 43.
Trust

